Hospital Admissions, Length of Stay, and Case-Mix Impacts of Per Case Payment: The Maryland Experience by David S. Salkever & Donald M. Steinwachs
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
HOSPITAL ADMISSIONS,
LENGTH OF STAY, AND CASE-MIX




Working Paper No. 2010




We wish to acknowledge financial support from the U.S. National
Center for Health Services Research under Grant HS 03831. The
thoughtful advice and comments of our project officer, Herbert
Traxler, of Michael Rosko, and of our colleagues, Richard Frank and
Robert Seidman, were gratefully received. Agnes Rupp made major
contributions to the development of our data base and approaches to
measurement of variables. Alison Jones and Sharon Paul provided
skillful programming support and Valerie Waudby helped us prepare
the manuscript. The research reported here is part of the NBER's
research program in Health Economics. Any opinions expressed are
those of the authors and not those of the National Bureau of
Economic Research.Working Paper #2010
August 1986
Hospital Admissions, Length of Stay, and Case-Mix Impacts of Per Case Payment:
The Maryland Experience
ABSTRACT
Maryland has simultaneously operated per case and per
service hospital payment systems since 1976 with varying
levels of stringency in setting per case rates. Regression
analyses of this experience are used to compare the impacts
of these systems on admissions, length of stay, and case—mix
costliness for the period July 1, 1976 to June 30, 1981. Our
resultsindicate a positive effect on admissions and negative
effects on case—mix and length of stay for the per case payment
approach relative to the per service approach. More stringent
levels of per case payment are associated with stronger utili-
zation responses.
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Although cost containment is a primary objective of
prospectivehospital payment systems1 itis widely
recognizedthat these systems mayalsoimpact or utilization
(1).These utilization impacts may be fully consistent with
the cost—containment goal; an example is reductions in
length of stay to eliminate days of inpatient care with
littleor no health benefits.,On the other hand, these
impacts could take the form o-f increases in utilization and
thus could undercut cost—containment efforts..
Concern has recently been e>fpressed about perverse
utilization impacts ofper diem and per service payment
systems in which hospitals receive additional revenues fo.r
each additional day or specific service (e.g., lab test).
This concern is supported by empirical evidence of positive
impacts on length of stay (2) and use of ancillary services
(3), and by findings of more negative impacts on per diem
than per case costs (4). To correct this deficiency of per
diem or per service payment systems, per case payment
systems have been developed (5,6)-. The Maryland Guaranteed
Inpatient Revenue (GIR) program, the first of these systems,
was introduced in 1976. New Jersey introduced aDRG-based
system in 1980 and Medicares Prospective Payment System
(PPS)wasenacted in 1983.A number of other states andprivate insurers have subsequently moved to adopt their own
per case payment programs (6).
Thispaper presents an empirical analysis of the
experience under the Maryland GIR program from 1976 to 19B1.
The Maryland program is of interest for several reasons.
First, it has been in effect the longest and has presumably
dealt with any operational problems in its start—up phase.
Second, the Maryland situation allows us to compare two
different approaches to per case payments, as well as a per
service payment scheme, since all three systems were in
operation in Maryland during our study period. Comparisons
among these systems in terms of impacts on admissions,
length—of—stay,and case—mix are presented here.
TheMaryland Health Services Cost Review Commission
(HSCRC) began setting rates for all hospitals in Maryland on
a per service basis on July 1, 1974. Selected hospitals
were first placed by the HSCRC on per case rates (the GIR)
in late 1976; during the five years of our study period
(July 1, 1976 to June 30, 1981) 22 of the 46 acute care
hospitals inour study had experience with per case
payments.Medicare and Medicaid waivers took effect on July
1, 1977 and brought all patients in the state under HSCRC
rates, including the per case rates for the GIR hospitals.
Perservice rates were set on the basis of budgeted
volumesand costs in routine care, special care, and
ancillary patient service centers. After an initial roundofdetailedratereviews (involvingexamination of
hospitals financial dataandcomparisons with peer
institutions),rateswere trended forward annually to
reflect inflation in factor costs and adjusted for volume
variances.When actual revenues in a year exceeded budgeted
revenuesbecauseservice volumes exceeded projections,
variable cost factors of .6 for routine services and .4 for
ancillary services were applied to the excess revenue to
determine how much the hospital was permitted to retain An
incremental variable cost factor of .7 was applied to
revenues due to equivalent admissions (i.e. ,admissions
adjusted for outpatient activity) more than 2 per cent over
the projected level.This factor increased to .B for
revenuesdue to equivalent admi ssi ons more than IC> per cent
above projected.
Whenactual revenues fell short of projectionsbecause
ofvolume shortfalls, a variable cost factor of .2 was
applied to determine the unrecovered fixed costs to be
included inthenextyears rates.If a hospital
experienced a shortfall of more than 5 per cent from its
projected equivalent admissions, the incremental variable
cost factor increased to .6 and .4 for routine care and
ancillary cost services respectively C7}.The asymmetry
betweenupward and downward variable cost factors was
intended to encourage reductions in unnecessary utilization—4.-
Per service rates were also set for SIR hospitals in
the manner just described and were the basis for generating
bills to their individual patients or third—party payors.
The GIR program superimposed on this process a projected
case—mix—adjusted revenue cap per case.If a GIR hospital
reali:ed an actual revenue per case below (above) its cap,
itreceivedadditional (reduced) revenues, via higher
(lower) rates in the following year, equal to the relevant
variable cost factor times the number of discharges times
the difference between the cap and actual revenue per case.
For example, assume a hospital's actual revenue exceeded
projected revenue and its overall variable cost factor was
approximately .5. If its case—mix—adjusted average revenue
per case was $500 below its GIR level, and it had 5,000
discharges, it received $500 x 5000 x.5 or $1,250,000 in
additional allowable revenue in next year's rates.
The GIR program was intended to create incentives to
reduce length of stay and use of ancillary services and to
be neutral for changes in the volume of admissions. It 15
possible,however, that it actually encouraged increased
admissions.If aSIRhospital reduced its length of stay
andancillaryrevenuesper case by 5 per cent and
simultaneously increased its admissions by 5 per cent (so
that actual revenue was about equal to projected) ,it.would
receive a SIR 'bonus" equal to 3.1 per cent of totalrevenues (9).Moreover, if these simultaneous changeE had
little effect on total costs, the 3.1 per cent GIR bonus
would all be added net revenue. A per service hospital in
the same si tuation would recci ye no net revenue bonus at
all.
Usually,the GIR level was derived fromthehospital s
own charges during a base period of its choosinq. For this
period, live discharges (excluding newborns) were grouped
according to a case—mix scheme and average charge per case
for each group was computed. Adjustment of these averace
charges for rate chanqes between the base and current
periods yielded current average charges which were then
applied to the current period frequency distribution of live
discharges by group to determine the current period GIR
level.
In three instances, hospitals were judged by the HSCRC
to have excessively high per case costs and were placed on a
per case revenue cap that was actually below projected
levels based on inflation adjustments and their historical
experience.For these three hospitals, which we shall term
CAP hospitals, the excess of average charge per case above
the cap was deducted from next year's rates while savings
below the cap were not added to next year's rates. Thus,
the main effect of reducing length of stay or ancillary use
was to reduce losses; bonus payments were not made for
beating the cap.Reductions in case—mix costliness were
also encouraged since the cap for these hospitals was not
case—mix—adjusted. Finally,as with the regular GIR,—6--
additional admissions could offset some c-fthe negative
impacts of reduced length—of--stay or ancillary use on total
revenues.
Whiletheconstraint onthe CAP hospitals was
mandatory, the GIR program was phased in on a voluntary
basis starting in late 1976. The HSCRC offered inducernent
for hospitals to go on the GIR, including an extra 1 per
centinflationallowance and additional administrative
expenses for a hospital to monitor its own performance.In
some instances, the GIR was offered to hospitals as an
alternative to a full review of rates which the HSCRC felt
would otherwise have been needed because of major service
additions, expansions, or out—of—line cost performance.
The strength of these inducements resulted in fairly
rapid implementation.Of the 46 non—Federal general acute
care hospitals in the State in 1976, six went on the GIR in
the latter part of 1976 (including two CAP hospitals), six
were added during 1977, six in 1978, three (including one
CAP hospital) in 1979, and one in 1980. Six hospitals
dropped off the GIR program and returned to per service
payment; these were smaller hospitals, generally lacking
adequate management information systems.One of the two
hospitals put on the cap in 1976 switched to a regular GIR
in 1981; the hospital put on the CAP in 1979 switched to the
regular GIR in late 1980.
The objective of the study -from which this paper
derives was to assess the impacts of the GIR per case—7--
payment system by comparing the experience ofMaryland's
general acute care hospitals under per case vs. per service
payment. Ouranalysispertains to the fiscal years
1977—1981 and the 46 hospitals operating throughout this
period.We have previously reported on cost, charge and
efficiencyimpacts {1O}. Thecurrent paper reports
estimates of GIR impacts on numbers of admissions, length of
stay, and hospital case—mix.
The regression models used for estimating these GIR
impacts are based on a standard short—run model of hospital
decision—making Cli).The hospital decision—makers are
presumed to choose variable input quantities and output
pricesso as to maximize an objective function based on
output quantity, quality, and net revenue. The hospital is
subject to constraints imposed by downward—sloping product
demand curves, technology, input prices, and fixed capital.
Assuming an interior solution to this maximization process,
the resulting optimal levels of admissions, length of stay,
andcase—mixcanberelated,viathe first—order
maximizationconditions, to the exogenous factors that
determine the constraints faced by the hospital. These
factors,which appear asindependentvariables in our
regressionmodels, pertain to market demand conditions
(e.g., income),inputprices (e.g., wages), and the
hospital s fixed capital stock.A measure of teaching
activity is also included to control for differences in
objectives between teaching and non—teaching institutions.
Within the context of this conceptual framework, GIR—8-
impactscouldbe interpreted as evidence of supplier
inducement in an imperfect agency relationship; this is
analogous to the often—studied inducement effects on the
demand-for physician services {12).For example, GIR
hospitals may respond to their incentive structures by
encouraging staff physicians to admit more patients and to
reduce length o-fstay.This encouragement istranslated
into induced demand if it affects the staff physicians'
recommendations totheirpatients. Effectsof GIR
incentives on case mix are less clear since the GIR level
will increase as case—mix costliness increases. For some of
thehospitals,however,thecase—mix categories for
calculating the GIR adjustment were fairly broad. Moreover
the CAP hospitals did not have their per case payment limit
tied to case—mix. In these instances, per case payment may
encourage admissions policies oriented toward a less costly
case mix.It should also be noted that GIR impacts on
case—mix could be theindirect result of GIR impacts on
admissions.For example, if per case payments encourage
admissions but it is generally easier to shift the demand
-foradmissions in the less costly case categories, a
negative impact on case—mix would be observed. In addition,
there is the possibility of changes in coding practices if
paymentsdepend upon the hospital 's case mix.Recent
analysisof the Medicare PPS program suggests that this
program did encourage hospitals to codepatientdata more
carefullywith the result that patients tended to be
classified into more costly DRGs (13).(This phenomenon is—9—
referredto as "DRG creep.")
SIR effects could also be observed even without direct
"inducement" or "demand manipulation.." For example, if per
case payment leads to improvements in efficiency that are
translated i.nto lower costs to patients, the number of
admissions demanded would rise (thoughtheprice elasticity
of demand is presumably small).Similarly, SIR—induced
reductions in waiting time for elective admissions could
increase the demand for admissions. We do not attempt in
this analysis to determine theprecisemechanism by which
per case payment may affect our dependent variables. Thus,
the importance of "inducement" as an explanation of SIR
effects will not be tested.
D2endentVari ab
Data on numbers of hospital admissions were taken from
the Medicare cost reports (MCRs) of the 46 study hospitals..
The average length of stay variable was computed from
tabulations of the discharge abstract data hospitals are
required to submit to the HSCRC. Occasional missing data
items were filled in from the American Hospital Association
Annual Survey data and statistical reports of the Maryland
Hospital Association.
The case—mix measure used in our study was developed
for two purposes:(1) to use as an explanatory variable in
cost—function regressions and (2) to serve as a dependent
variable in examining hospital responses to the financial
incentives under Marylands per case payment arrangements..—10—
Accordingly, we devised a measure that used data on charges
for constructing weights for each care category. This
approach, which hasbeenused in many hospital cost studies,
assumesthere isat least a strong correl ation between costs
andcharges for the various types of cases. Given this
assumption, we refer to ourindex asa measureof case—mix
costliness(14).
Ourcase—mixcostliness index is developed from data on
thediagnostic classification and charges forall short—stay
hospital discharges in Maryland provided by the M.ryland
Resource Center (MRC) and the HSCRC.The computational
methodbegins bydefining a "market basket" set of
diagnosticcategories.The original Diagnostic Related
Grouping(DRG) classification scheme with 383 DRGs is
employed and the following nine DRGs are included asthe
"marketbasketset:
074 Diabetes without Surgery withoutSecondary Diagnosis or
with Minor Secondary Diagnosiswith Age greater than
35.
075Diabetes without Surgery with Major Secondary
Diagnosis.
121 Disease of the Heart — Aci.te Myocardial Infarction.
132 Disease of the Heart — Failure (poor function) without
Surgery.
158Hemorrhoids
167 PneumoniawithoutSurgery with Secondary Diagnosis with
Age greater than 30.
264 Disease of the Female Reproductive System with Surgical
Procedures (D'C, Visualization, Removal of Fallopian
Tubes)without Secondary Diagnosis.
265 Disease of the Female Reproductive System with Surgical—11—
Procedure(DC, Visuali:ation, Other with Secondar-y
Dianosi S.
266 Disease of the Female Reproductive System with Surgery
(Removal ofWomb, Repair of Female Reproductive Organ,
Other Major).
This set of categories was selected because it includes both
surgical and non—surgical cases and because all nine DRGs
are common and were reported by all the study hospitals.
(Note that obstetrical conditions are absent sir,ce several
of the hospitals do not have obstetrical units.)
The next step in thecomputational procedure was to
calculatethe average charge in 1980 for each of the nine
DRGs in each hospital and to average these nine averages
within each hospital to compute an overall "market basket"
average charge for each study hospital in 1980. This figure
was then divided into the actual charge figure for every
discharge in every DRG in each of the study hospitals in
1980, so that all 1980 charge data for individual patients
were expressed relative to the hospital "market basket"
average.
For each of the 383 DRGs, these relative charge figures
were averaged across patients within each hospital, and then
these hospital—specific averages were averaged across all
hospitals reporting at least one patient in that DRG. The
result was a statewide average relative costliness figure
for each of the 383 DRGs. Finally, these 383 figures were
applied to the frequency distribution of discharges in each
of the 5tudy years in each hospital to compute the case mix—12—
costlinessindex.
Itshould be noted that the use f an index based on
relative weights hasone important advantage over a simpler
index based on absolute charges. In particular, thisindex
is muchless sensitive to variations among DRGs in the
distributionofpatients across hospitals.Thus, any
particular DRG that might happen to be more common in less
efficient hospitals will not have a high relative costliness
weight simply because of thisfact.
Trendsin dependent variable values for hospitals
grouped according to GIR status are reported in Table 1.
Comparing the LOS results in the last two rows of the table,
we observe a more rapid rise in the 1977—79 period for
non—SIR hospitals and a s]ower decline in 1979—81. The
latter result is due to a very sharp decline in LOS (12.03
percent) in the CAP hospitals in 1979—81.
Case—mix index values moved downward for all groups of
hospitals in 1977—79. In the 1979—81 period, case—mix rose
slightly in the non—SIR hospitals but declined slowly for
mostofthe hospitals on per case payment. If per case
payment induces "DRG creep," it is not evident from these
data.
Admissions increased throughout the study period for
most groups of hospitals.The growth for GIR hospitals
tended to be below that of other hospitals in the 19798l
period; however this may have been due in large part to
environmental factors such as slower population growth in
BaltimoreCity(where many of the GIR hospitals are—13--
located)..Results fromour-multiple regression analyses
(reported below) controlling fortheseenvironmental factors
provide some evidence oftheexpected positive GIR effect or,
admi 551OnS.
Alisting ofexplanatoryvariables is shown in Table 2.
The input price measure is the average nursing wage level in
the area where the hospital is located (NWAGE). Measures of
thehospitals capital—stock are bed—days available CBDDYS)
(i.e. ,averagebed complement x365) and the ratio of
special care to total beds (SPECTRO).As a measure of
teaching activity, we also include the number of approved
residency positions per bed in the hospital (POSBED) (15).
(Dataonnumbers of residents actually filling these
positions were not available for the full study period.)
Other explanatory variables include county population
characteristics presumedtoinfluenceproduct—demand
conditions (MEDAGE, HSIZE, HINC, PUBASST, and MCARE) and the
estimated service area population (HPOF'), which is the
county population multiplied by the ratio of acute care beds
in the hospital to acute care beds in the county (16). To
control for possible substitution or complernentarity effects
of other available health care resources, ACRATIO and MDPOP
are included (17>.
The independent variables expressed in dollars (HINC
and NWAGE) were deflated by a cost—of—living index. Index
valueswere computed for the Baltimore area, for the—14—
Washington suburban area in Maryland, and for all other
parts of the state. While this deflation procedure controls
for general economy—wide inflation, dummy variables for
individual years arealso included. Effects of
technologicalchangeorotheryear—specificchanges
affecting all hospitals should be picked up by these dummy
var I ab 1 es -
Threepairs of SIR variables were included. For all
hospitals on the SIR for at least six months in a fiscal
year, a GIR dummy (GIRSTAT) was set equal to lO. The
coefficient of this variable measures the one—time impact of
going on the SIR.To allow for the possibility that the
initial GIR impact changed over time, the number of months
duringwhich the hospital was on the SIR (TIME) was
included.
Differences between teaching and non—teaching hospitals
in GIF< impacts are captured by the coefficients of GIRTEACH
and TIMTEACH.Such differences might be expected because
clinical decisions in teaching hospitals are more likely to
rest with physicians who are salaried hospital employees
and, therefore, arguably more sensitive to the hospital s
financial incenti yes.
The third pair of variables, also analogous to GIF<STAT
and TIME, are CAP and CAPTIME. These only take on nonerO
values for the three hospitals whose per case payment limit
was not based on their own past experience because their
cost per case figures were deemed excessive. For these
hospitals,the per case payment limit imposed a more—15—
stringent financial constraint.
In addition, to capture the impact of going off the GIF
system, the dummy variable ONOFF was set equal to 1.0 for
eachyearin which a previously GIR hospital was offthe
system. Similarly, CAPOFF 1for 1981 for the two
hospitals that went off the CAP; otherwise it equals zero.
Finally, note that other recent studies based on the
same conceptual framework have assumed that casemixis
exogenous(18).This assumptionmay be justified onthe
grounds that case mixessentiallyreflects the facilities
andservices available at the hospital and that these are
fixedin the short run. Alternatively, one might argue that
case mix measures exogenous demand characteristics that are
analogous to demographic and socio—economic characteristics
of the population.While we obviously do not generally
maintain the exogenous case mix assumption in our study,
somelength of stay models are estimated with ourcase mi>:
variable (DRGMIX) included as a regressor.
Functional Form and Estimation Method
All regressions are estimated with the dependent and
continuousindependent variablesentered in logarithmic
form.Exceptions are POSBED, SPECRTO, TIME, TIMTEACH,and
CAPTIMEwhich are enteredin linear form because of zero
valuesfor many data points.
Tocontrol for possible correlation of regression
disturbances for the same hospital over time, we have
employedthefixed—effectsmethodofleast—squares—16—
regression with pooled data.This method involves the
inclusion of dummy variables for each hospital in the sample
(save one if a constant term is also included). Coefficient
estimates obtained with this method will not be biased by
omitted hospital—specific characteristics that are stable
over the study period.This is important in that these
hospital characteristics may have been correlated with the
GIR variable (since hospitals were not randomly selected for
the GIR program>.Bear in mind, however, that this method
doesnottakeintoaccountautocorrelation due to
auto—regressivedisturbances,and that it is somewhat
inefficientsinceany information from cross—sectional
variation isnotusedin estimating the regression
coefficients.Thus, it is a rather conservative method of
measuring GIR effects in the sense that it will tend to
yield less significant coefficient estimates than other
methods which are more susceptible to omitted variable bias
C 19)
Estimated length of stay regressions with GIRSTAT, TIME
and ONOFF included to capture overall average GIR effects
areshownin Table 3.Regression(1) includes DRGMIX as an
explanatory variable while regression (2) does not.In both
instances,thethreeGIRvariables do not approach
statisticalsignificance individually; joint F—tests of
these variables are also insignificant.Among the other
explanatory variables, BDDYS, HPOP, and DRGMIX have the mostsignificant c:oefficients; these results seem plausible since
they indicate that increases in bed complement (holding
population constant), decreases in market area population
(holding bed complement constant) and increases in case—mix
costliness raise length ofstay.The Medicare variable
(MCARE) coefficient also becomes significantly negative when
DRGMIX is dropped, presumably reflecting a negative partial
correlationbetween DRGMIX and MCARE. (The zero—order
correlationbetweenthesetwo variables is, however,
+(.223.)
While the overall GIR results were not significant,
regressions including other GIR variables indicated the
possibility of more substantial length—of—stay effects for
some groups of hospitals.When each of the eight GIR
variables was entered as the sole GIR variable in our
regression, with DRGMIX included, a significantly negative
coefficient (—0..00253) with a (one—tailed P =0.0137)was
obtained forCAPTIME. WhenDRGMIXwasexcluded,
significantlynegativecoefficientswere obtained for
CAPTIME and for TIMTEACH. (Coefficient values were —0.00296
and —0.00083 respectively while corresponding one—tailed
P—values were 0.0053 and 0.0868.)
ResultsobtainedwhenSIR variables are entered
stepwise are shown in Table 4.In the first column of the
table, with DRGMIX included, CAP enters with a significantly
positive coefficient while the negative CAPTIME coefficient
increses in magnitude.Since CAP only changed from 0 to 1
for one hospital over the study period, while it changed for—18—
1 to 0 for two hospitals in 1981, its positive coefficient
maybepickingup the persistence of length—of—stay
reductions as hospitals went off the CAP.
This accords with the result in column 2 that when
CAPOFF is included, the positive CAP coefficient diminishes
in size and becomes insignificant. A similar difference is
observed when DRGMIX is not included in the regression
(columns 3 and 4) but the positive CAPOFF coefficient does
not become clearly insignificant.
As in the length of stay analysis, overall GIR effects
as measured by the coefficients for GIRSTAT, TIME, and ONOFF
in Table 5 are clearly not significant, though in this case
allhavenegativesigns. Among the other included
variables, BDDYSandSPECRTO have highly significant
positivecoefficients; the former result suggests that
increases in bed complement were accompanied by additions of
equipment and more sophisticated treatment facilities. The
availability of alternative facilities (ACRATIO) also has a
positive impact on the case—mix index.The population
variable (HPOP) is strongly negative, suggesting that as the
demand for beds increases, reductions in length of stay are
accompanied by relatively greater increases in less costly
admissions.The Medicare and public assistance variables
are also significantly negative.
When GIR variables are included one at a time in the
case—mix regressions (Table 6), only the CAPTIME coefficient—19—
isstronglynegative. Thisparallels the analogous
length—of—stay result described above..The negative TIME
coefficient implies a negative overall GIR effect but it is
clearly less significant.
In the stepwise case—mix regressions shown in Table 7,
CAPTIME continues to be significantly negative. Both CAP
and CAPOFF are strongly positive.For the two hospitals
going off the CAP in 1981, the values of CAPTIME in 1980
were 18 and 42. With the former value, the coefficients in
column 3 of Table 7 imply virtually no change in DRGMIX from
1980 to 1981; with the latter value for CAPTIME, DRGMIX
rises by about .05 when the hospital went off the CAP.
Thus, the question of reversibility of the CAP effect is
left in doubt by these findings..
eionsegressio
The admission regression in Table 5 shows significant
coefficients for all three included GIR variables; a joint
F—test of these variables was also significant. Two of
thesecoefficients (forTIME and ONOFF) are in the
hypothesized direction whilethenegativeGIRSTAT
coefficient is not.One possible explanation for this
unexpectedresultis the non—random process by which
hospitals were selected into the GIR.If a hospital had an
unusually low volume of admissions in a particular year and
this caused a large increase in unit costs and rates, this
could have encouraged HSCRC staff to propose putting a
hospital on the GIR.-
—4-
Amongtheotherexplanatoryvariables, the bed
complement, teaching activity, and market area population
variables all had highly significant positive coefficients.
The negative MCARE and SPECRTO coefficients were nearly
signi ficant.
Inclusion of SIR variables one at a time in the
admissions regression yielded significantpositive
coefficients(as hypothesized) for TIME, TIMTEACH, arid
CAPTIME (Table 6).When additional GIR variables were
entered stepwise (Table 7, columns 1 and 2), the positive
CAPTIME result seems most robust.
In comparing the results of the various regressions and
alternative specifications of the SIR variables, several
conclusions emerge.First, the time—related SIR variables
(TIME, TIMTEACH, and CAPTIME) tend to be more significant
and to display coefficients with the expected sign than is
true for the other SIR variables (GIRSTAT, GIRTEACH, CAP).
Since the latter variables are more likely to be picking up
unobservabllefactorsrelatingtoselectioninto a
particular payment status, and since it is plausible to
assume that hospital responses to per case payment will be
gradual (and thus time—related), rather than instantaneous,
we view our results asprovidingfairly strong support for
the general hypothesis that admissions, case—mix, andlength
of stay will be influenced by per case payment incentives.—21—
Second, the estimated per case payment effects are
strongestfor the hospitals under the tightest fiscal
constraint, that is,theCAP hospitals. In particular,
CAPTIMEcoefficientsare all highly significant, with
expected signs, andlarge in magnitude. CAFTIME
coefficients as large as .0025 (as shown in Tables 4 and 7)
combined with a mean CAFTIME value for CAP hospitals of 26
months, imply an impact of about 7 per cent on the dependent
variables. As we have previously observed, the greater
impact on the CAP hospitals probably reflects a differential
response of non—profit hospitals to financial incentives.
Threats of substantial biases under a stringent payment
mechanism (the CAP) appear to evo::e a stronger response than
do opportunities to earn positive net revenues (under the
GIR in general).
Third, the results of our admissions analysis support
the general proposition that per case payment systems are
not immune from the possibility of perverse utilization
responses.Thus, simply switching from per diem (or per
service)to per case payments may not yield dramatic
reductions in total costs and "unnecessary" utilization.
Provision for utilization monitoring systems, such as the
PROs under the Medicare PPS, may also be a key element of a
successful cost control strategy. Comparison of per case
versus per diem (or per service) systems should also extend
to quality concerns if the per case limits are stringent.
This point is amply illustrated by recent discussions of the
Medicare PPS.—22—
Finally, while ourresultsmay support more general
conclusionsabout the relativemerits of per case and per
servicepayment systems, it is important to take note of a
number of qualifications.First, the generalizability of
our results to other states may be limited. When compared
to experience in other states, the per service payment
system in Maryland appears to be fairly stringent. Thus,
the difference in incentives between the SIR and non—SIR
hospitals might be less pronounced in comparison with the
overall pressures for unit cost control imposed by the
Maryland system on both SIR and non—GIR hospitals. Second,
absence of clear overall SIR effects may be due in part to
the Fact that the length of time on the SIR for hospitals in
the study was fairly short (averaging a little over two
years). Subsequent research is now under way with a longer
time frame of cost impacts. Third, the weak overall effects
may reflect the conservative statistical procedures we have
employed.The fixed—effects model tends to produce lower
significancelevels since it excludes information from
cross—sectional variation in estimating the parameters of
interest.This also makes estimation of differences in
impacts among groups of hospitals more difficult. While it
is necessary to use a number of GIR variables, to test for
these differences in impacts (CAP vs. non—CAP, teaching vs.
non—teaching), many of these variables will be strongly
correlated with one another.Our ongoing research with a
longertimeseries of data for Maryland will yield more
powerful tests and also allow us to compare per—case and
fixed—budgetpaymentapproaches.—23—
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aAll regressions reported here and in subsequent tables include
separate intercepts for each hospital and each year. All con-
tinuous dependent and independent variables are expressed as
logarithms except for SPECRTO, POSBED and GIR—related time
variables.
bAll P—values reported here and below are two—tailed.
—30—










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5: Regression Results for Admissions
and Case—Mix
Dep. Vble. Admissions Case-Mix
Indep. Vbles. Coeff. P Coeff. P
GIRSTAT —0.05137 0.0153 —0.00485 0.6742
TIME 0.00172 0.0133 —0.00045 0.2338
ONOFF —0.07320 0.0259 —0.01770 0.3237
BDDYS 0.48333 0.0000 0.10834 0.0349
SPECRTO —0.64140 0.1220 0.43772 0.0550
POSBED 331.296 0.0060 —97.68440 0.1363
NWAGE 0.23930 0.4889 0.28022 0.1409
MDPOP —0.01773 0.8431 —0.00937 0.8489
ACRATIO —0.25825 0.2314 0.18501 0.1189
HPOP 0.37223 0.0006 —0.10975 0.0630
MCARE —0.35942 0.1401 —0.35132 0.0091
PUBASST —0.02370 0.7822 —0.19689 0.0000
HINC 0.21715 0.4429 0.19823 0.2027
HSIZE —0.08927 0.7828 —0.15547 0.3822
MEDAGE —0.29600 0.6360 0.49436 0.1510—33—
Table 6: Results for Sin1e CUR Variables
with P <Q.2in Admissions
and Case—Mix Regressions
Dep.Vble. Admissions Case-Mix
mdep. Vb I es. Coeff. P Coe f f. P
TIME 0.00121 0.0333 —0.0078 0.1849
TIMTEACH 0.00146 0.0249
CAPTIME 0.00254 0.0419 —0.00132 0.0487
ONOFF —0.06035 0.0374T
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